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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6073 
BALDWIN PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described, below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6073 - 2 -
Included: Part-time Cleaner, Part-time Clerk, Part-time Clerk-Sub, Part-time 
Library Aide, Part-time Library, Part-time Librarian-Sub, Page H.ET, 
Page HET-Sub, Part-time Typist/Clerk and Part-time Typist/Clerk-
Sub. 
Excluded: Employees who are regularly scheduled less than eight (8) hours 
per pay period and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees"Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
c 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November .30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF BROOME AND BROOME COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and- .' CASE NO. U-30019 
BROOME COUNTY SHERIFF'S LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS'ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
BROOME COUNTY SHERIFF'S LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS'ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30044 
COUNTY OF BROOME AND BROOME COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH SLUZAR, COUNTY ATTORNEY (ROBERT G. BEHNKE of counsel), 
for County of Broome and Broome County Sheriff 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Broome County Sheriff's Law Enforcement 
Officers'Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
"These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Broome County 
Sheriff's Law Enforcement Officers' Association, Inc., (Association) to a decision of an 
Case No. U-30019 & U-30044 - 2 -
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 The ALJ rejected the Association's argument that the 
improper practice charge filed by the County of Broome and Broome County Sheriff (Joint 
Employer), Case No. U-30019, is untimely. In addition, the ALJ sustained the Joint 
Employer's charge, in part, by concluding that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act by submitting proposals concerning the following contract articles to interest 
arbitration that are not directly related to compensation as required by §209.4(g) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act): Article 13 (Pre-Shift Reporting Pay); Article 
21 (Paid Leave of Absence); Article 22 (Sick Leave); and Article 23 (General Municipal 
Law (GML) §207-c procedures).2 • 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association contends that the ALJ erred in failing to dismiss 
the Joint Employer's charge as untimely, and in finding that the above referenced 
Association proposals are not arbitrable pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act. The Joint 
Employer supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ correctly held that the Joint Employer's charge is timely, pursuant to 
§205.6(b) of the Rules of Procedure, because it was filed prior to the date of the filing of 
1
 43 PERB 1J4614 (2010).. 
2
 The text of the at-issue Association proposals for Articles 13,21 and 22, and a 
summary of the Association's GML §207-c proposal are set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
Supra, note 1, 43 PERB 1J4614 at 5044-5045. 
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the Joint Employer's response to the Association's petition for arbitration.3 Therefore, 
we reject the Association's exception with respect to that issue. 
In Orange County Deputy, Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc4 (County 
of Orange), we reiterated that the applicable test for determining whether a particular 
demand is directly related to compensation, and therefore arbitrable under §209.4(g) of 
the Act, is the one first articulated in New York State Police Investigators Association5 
(State Police): 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
. amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).6 [Emphasis in original.] 
In County of Orange, we also reaffirmed the holding in State Police that a proposal 
limited to seeking an increase in the amount of accumulated leave without a wage 
3
 See, City of Elmira, 25 PERB p072 (1992); Canton Police Ass'n, 44 PERB 1J3019 
(2011). In addition, the ALJ correctly rejected the Association's erroneous argument 
premised upon South Nyack/Grand View Jt Pub Admin Bd, 35 PERB 1J3007 (2002). 
4
 44.PERB 1J3023 (2011). 
5
 30 PERB 1J3013 (1997), confirmed sub nom., New York State Police Investigators 
Ass'n v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB 1J7011 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1997). 
6
 Supra, note 5, 30 PERB 1J3013 at 3028. 
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reduction is not directly related to compensation, and therefore, is not arbitrable under 
§209.4(g) of the Act. In addition, we concluded that when a unitary demand contains an 
inseparable nonarbitrable component, the demand cannot be reasonably interpreted to 
v.. 
be solely, predominantly or primarily related to increasing the level or amount of 
compensation, and therefore, it does not satisfy the applicable arbitrability test under 
§209.4(g)oftheAct. 
In the present case, the proposal concerning Article 13 includes two demands 
that address pre-shift reporting pay. The first seeks to modify §13.6.1 of the parties' 
January 1, 2005-December 31, 2008 collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) by 
mandating for the first time that all non-supervisory employees report fifteen minutes 
before the commencement of their shift, and by requiring that those employees be paid 
overtime for that period.7 The second demand would add a new provision to the 
agreement, §13.6.2 requiring all Deputy Sheriff Sergeants to report to work thirty 
minutes before their shift and receive overtime for that period. 
Contrary to the Association's argument, the first demand is not limited to seeking 
a change in the rate of pay for the fifteen minute pre-shift report. It would also change 
the schedule for those unit members who have not previously been required to work the 
pre-shift period. Similarly, the second demand contains two components: a change in 
7Section13.6 of the expired agreement states: ' • • 
Employees regularly required to-report to work at least fifteen (15) minutes 
prior to the starting hour of their shift shall be compensated for this time at 
their regular rate of pay. (ie: 15 minutes - % of the hourly rate) Any 
employee not reporting for the pre-shift report shall not receive pay for this 
time. 
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the schedule for the Deputy Sheriff Sergeants, and a requirement that they be paid 
overtime for the additional hours of work. 
Both demands in the proposal concerning Article 13 are unitary; each contains 
the inseparable subject of scheduling, a nonarbitrable subject under §209.4(g) of the 
Act. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) 
of the Act by submitting each demand to interest arbitration. 
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to Association's 
proposals regarding Article 21 and Article 22. Each of those proposals is drafted so that 
it includes two severable components: an increase in the accumulation of leave, and the 
monetization of all unused leave at the time of separation of service. We affirm the 
ALJ's conclusion that the proposed increases in the accumulation of leave set forth in 
§§21.6.1 and 22.1.3 are not arbitrable under State Police and County of Orange. We, 
however, reverse the ALJ to the extent that she found the severable and distinct 
proposals in §§21.6.1 and 22.5.1, calling for-the conversion of unused leave time to 
cash, to be not arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. As we determined in County of 
Orange, payment for unused accumulated leave when an employee separates from 
service is a form of deferred compensation. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the proposal concerning Article 23, 
which seeks a comprehensive GML §207-c procedure, is not arbitrable under §209.4(g). 
of the Act. While portions of this unitary proposal relate to compensation, those portions 
are inextricably intertwined with multiple nonarbitrable subjects pursuant to §209.4(g) of 
Case No. U-30019 & U-30044 - 6 -
the Act, including scheduling, application procedures, medical examinations and 
treatment, light duty assignments and hearing procedures.8 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the Association's exceptions, in part, and 
affirm the ALJ's decision finding that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act 
when it submitted proposals §§13.6.1 and 13.6.2 and proposal Article 23 to interest 
arbitration, and when it submitted the leave accumulation demands in proposals §21.6.1 
and §22.1.3 to interest arbitration. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Association withdraw proposals §§13.6.1, 
13.6.2 and 22.1.3, proposal Article 23 from interest arbitration, and that it withdraw 
proposal §21.6.2 from interest arbitration except for the portions of the proposal that call 
for compensation for unused accumulated leave at the time of separation from service. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
& 
Jerome Lefkow/fz, Chairr^efson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
8
,See, Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff's Association, Inc., 44 PERB P024 (2011); 
Madison County Deputy Sheriff's PBA, Inc., 44 PERB P035 (2011); Highland Fails 
PBA, Inc., 42 PERB P020 (2009). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CANANDAIGUA FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 2098, IAFF, 
Charging Party,' 
CASE NO. U-29660 
- and -
CITY OF CANANDAIGUA, 
Respondent. 
: • - • -
CHAMBERLAIN D'AMANDA (MATTHEW J. FUSCO of counsel), for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING.PLLC (TERRY O'NEIL and HOWARD M. WEXLER of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Canandaigua 
(City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by the Canandaigua Firefighters Association, Local 2098, 
IAFF (Association) alleging that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it, inter alia, unilaterally transferred certain firefighter 
duties exclusively performed by Association unit members in the Canandaigua Fire 
Department (Department) to volunteer firefighters. The City filed an answer denying it 
violated the Act and it asserted various affirmative defenses. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act when it unilaterally.transferred the performance of the following unit duties to 
volunteer Department firefighters: driving and operating City-owned fire department 
Case No. U-29660 -2-
vehicles, daily maintenance duties at City fire stations and grounds and testing and 
cleaning fire apparatus and equipment in City fire stations. In addition, the ALJ. found 
that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally transferred the testing of 
fire hydrants, fire inspections and firefighting services in the Town of Canandaigua to 
other individuals outside of the Association unit.1 
At the request of the City, the Board heard oral argument on March 1, 2010. 
During the course of oral argument, the Board requested the parties to address a 
jurisdictional question under §205.5(d) of the Act based upon the terms of the parties' 
agreement. Thereafter each party submitted a supplemental brief addressing the 
jurisdictional issue. In its supplemental brief, the City argues that the matter requires an 
interpretation of the agreement, which should be deferred to arbitration. 
FACTS 
Pursuant to §9.7 of the Canandaigua City Charter (City Charter), the Department 
is composed of paid firefighters and members of at least two volunteer fire companies. 
The Department is headed by a Fire Chief who is appointed by the City's Director of 
Public Safety with City Council approval.2 Section 9.10 of the City Charter authorizes 
the City Council to determine the number of paid firefighters in the Department. . 
The Association is the exclusive representative of all paid full-time firefighters 
and captains in the Department. The City and the Association are parties to a 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement). Article 12 of the agreement states:. 
1
 43 PERB 1J4563 (2010). 
2
 Joint Exhibit 14, §9.8. 
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FIRE DEPARTMENT RULES 
Section 1. All rules and regulations of the Fire Department 
not covered by this Agreement shall be covered in general 
and special orders and by the published Fire Department 
Rules and Regulations book. The Association shall be 
consulted for suggestions in the event of any revisions of the 
rules and regulations. Effective January 1, 1995, these 
Rules and Regulations shall include the annual testing of fire 
hydrants as a Firefighter work responsibility, (emphasis 
supplied). 
Article 16, §1 of the agreement also states: 
The City and the Association agree that the on-duty 
Firefighters shall be responsible for the normal and 
reasonable fire station cleanliness inside and out, and that 
normal maintenance of the fire stations, equipment and 
apparatus shall be included in the duties of the on-duty 
Firefighters. Normal maintenance shall not include major 
repairs to buildings, equipment or apparatus, (emphasis 
supplied). .. 
Under Article 22, §1 of the agreement, Association members who may be 
appointed as fire inspectors shall receive an $800.00 stipend above their regular rate of 
pay under the agreement's salary schedule. 
The City Council adopted separate and distinct sets of rules and regulations for . 
paid and volunteer firefighters in the Department. The rules and regulations for paid 
firefighters are set forth in the Canandaigua Fire Department Career Personnel Rules 
and Regulations ("Career Personnel Rules and Regulations") which were adopted in 
1984, and most recently revised in 1997.3 The applicable rules and regulations for 
volunteer firefighters and captains are contained in the Canandaigua Fire Department 
Volunteer Personnel Rules and Regulations ("Volunteer Personnel Rules and 
3
 Joint Exhibit 9. 
Case No. U-29660 .4. 
Regulations"), which were adopted in 1992.4 Under the respective rules and 
regulations, all salaried and volunteer firefighters are members of the Department and 
they are responsible for complying with all Department rules and regulations.5 Both 
sets of rules and regulations identify duties and responsibilities concerning the operation 
of Department equipment and responding to fires and emergencies. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to Article 12 of the parties' agreement, all terms and conditions of 
employment that are not covered by the terms of the agreement may be subject to 
modification by general or special orders or by changes to the Career Personnel Rules 
and Regulations and/or Volunteer Personnel Rules and Regulations. In addition, it 
requires the City to consult with the Association for suggestions concerning any 
revisions to the rules and regulations. Article 12 also contains an explicit provision 
regarding the testing of fire hydrants by unit members. 
Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that: "the board shall not 
have authority to enforce an agreement between an employer.and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an 
agreement...." Inasmuch as the last sentence of Article 12 of the agreement 
concerning the annual testing of fire hydrants is clear and unambiguous, and is not 
subject to change by the process specified in the earlier sentences of Article./! 2, we 
reverse the ALJ with respect to the testing of fire hydrants, and dismiss that part of the 
4
 Joint Exhibit 12. 
5
 Joint Exhibit 9, §105.01; Joint Exhibit 12, §§1.5, 4.2. 
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charge. 
It is less clear whether the first two sentences of Article 12 of the agreement 
constitute consent by the Association to the City's unilateral alteration of non-contractual 
past practices by issuing general or special orders or by the revision of Fire Department 
Rules. Inasmuch as nothing in the record or in the parties' briefs or arguments assist us 
in making or rejecting such a conclusion, rather than attempting to resolve the 
jurisdictional questions by either deciding them on the basis of the record before us, or 
reversing the. remainder of the ALJ's decision and remanding the case for further • 
evidence, we hereby choose to defer this matter to the parties' negotiated grievance 
arbitration procedure in accordance with Herkimer County BOCES.6 We also note that 
the charge's allegations concerning performance of fire inspections, and maintenance 
and cleaning.of the fire stations, grounds, equipment and apparatus appear to raise 
questions under Articles 16 and 22 of the agreement relevant both to our jurisdiction 
and the merits of the charge. It is, therefore, appropriate that we defer all these issues 
to arbitration in order to avoid wasteful duplication of effort.7 
' I t IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the charge be dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds insofar as it alleges a violation of §209-a. 1(d) of the Act with respect to the 
testing of fire hydrants. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the determination of PERB's jurisdiction and 
the merits of the remainder of the charge alleging violations of §209-a.1(d) of the Act is 
620PERBP050(1987). 
7
 County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB1J3006 (2008); New York City 
Transit Authority (Bordansky), 4 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
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deferred, and the charge is conditionally dismissed. The Association has the 
opportunity to file a timely motion to the Board at the conclusion of the contractual 
grievance procedure to reopen the charge in accordance with our decision herein. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
• Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowjfz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
i, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADIRONDACK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28120 
, - and -
ADIRONDACK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES HENCK, for Charging Party 
JOANNE M. NOVAK, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions of the Adirondack Central School District 
(District) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). on an improper practice charge 
filed by the Adirondack Teachers Association (Association), finding that the District violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally ended a 
past practice of permitting unit member's children to be present at the Adirondack High School 
during that school's tenth period.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ erred in rejecting its mission-related 
and contract reversion defenses and in relying upon the decision in Ostelic Valley Central 
School District* (hereinafter Ostelic Valley). In addition, the District challenges the ALJ's 
1
 43 PERB H4548(2010). 
2
 29 PERB H3005(1996). 
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proposed remedy on the grounds that the Association did not present evidence that unit 
members incurred expenses as a result of the District's unilateral action. The Association 
supports the ALJ's decision.3 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
reverse the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The applicable facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the District's exceptions. 
The Association represents a unit composed of District teachers and other certified 
professional staff. The District and the Association are parties to a collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement), which expired on June 30, 2010. The agreement is silent concerning 
the presence of children with their respective faculty member parent during the normal 
workday, which is 8:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. 
Article XXVI(A) of the agreement states: 
1. Individual Help to Students Outside of the Regular 
Class Period 
Each professional employee will provide extra and 
3
 The Association has not filed a cross-exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the District 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by only ending the practice at high school although the 
evidence demonstrates that the District ended a similar past practice at an elementary school, 
where students were permitted to be present with their respective faculty member parent 
before and after the normal school day but during the faculty workday. Based upon the lack of 
such cross-exception the issue of the change in practice at that elementary school is waived 
under §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure (Ruies). See, Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 
1J3008 (2007), confirmed, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 40 PERB 
117008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007); Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Police PBA, Inc., 44 
PERB H3023 (2011). 
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~^, individual help during the activity period. The timing 
and scheduling of other assistance will be set up by 
the individual professional employee. 
There are nine periods of classroom instruction at the high school. The Monday-
Thursday schedule, however, includes a tenth period, which runs from 2:45 p.m. to 3:25 p.m.. 
Article XXVI(A) of the agreement requires teachers to be present in their classroom during 
, tenth period for scheduled or unscheduled remedial instruction.4 Students are not obligated 
to attend the tenth period or, if present, accept remedial instruction from a teacher. As a 
result, there are days when a teacher may not have any high school students in attendance 
during the tenth period. 
There is a multi-year past practice, known to the District, of children of high school 
teachers being present in their respective parent's classroom during the tenth period. These ' 
•\ children are District students who attend other schools and are bused to the high school 
following completion of their school day. On certain Thursdays, faculty and departmental 
meetings at the high school are held during tenth period and remedial instruction is not 
offered. When such meetings are held, faculty member's children are unsupervised and 
without an assigned place to congregate. 
During the hearing before the ALJ, the Association called one teacher to describe the 
past practice. He testified that, when necessary, his children would do their homework, work 
on a computer or go to another teacher's classroom, to ensure a proper educational ., 
environment for remedial instruction. He denied, however, remembering anyone making 
complaints about his children's presence at the school. 
It is undisputed that James Chase (Chase), before he became Association President, 
-^
 4The District has a practice of dismissing teachers early on Fridays, following the ninth period 
and after the students board their buses. 
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complained to the District about the practice of colleagues' children being present at the high 
school during the tenth period. Among the teachers mentioned by Chase was the same 
teacher who testified on behalf of the Association at the hearing. Chase's complaints to the 
District focused on disruptive misbehavior of children including: clapping erasers causing chalk 
dust to cover classroom computers; running in the hallways; being present in the faculty 
lounge; sword fighting with pointers; and engaging in other forms of horseplay. In addition, 
one parent complained to a principal that a student's remedial session was disrupted by the 
presence of young children. 
After becoming Association President, Chase and the Association Vice-President spoke 
with the District Superintendent Frederick Morgan (Morgan) in August 2007, about the District 
ending the practice. During his unrefutted testimony, Morgan stated: 
And Mr. Chase, you know, talked to me about stopping this 
practice, he wanted the childcare after school stopped, the kids 
fooling around, he wanted that stopped. I asked if the association-
could do it, you know, maybe it would be better for the association, 
he and Ted McCall to deal with that, with the association and get it 
stopped, he said I don't believe I have that authority, it would be 
best to come from the administration, I said fine, we'll do it, okay.5 
The issue of the past practice was discussed at the September and October 2007 
meetings of the Adirondack Central School District Board of Education (Board of Education). 
At Chase's request, the Board of Education met with him to discuss the practice during the 
executive session portion of the Board of Education's meeting. During that discussion, Chase 
described the problems caused by the practice including misbehavior in the halls and 
classrooms by the children of three faculty members. In addition, Chase suggested to.Board 
members possible means for addressing the problems associated with the childcare issue. 
As a result of the October meeting, the Board of Education directed Morgan to • 
5
 Transcript, p. 52. 
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f^) terminate the practice on a District-wide basis. When informed by Morgan of the District's 
decision to end the practice, Chase responded, "good."6 Pursuant to the directive issued by 
the Board of Education, Morgan distributed a memorandum dated October 16, 2007, to 
Association members announcing the end of the practice. 
Both Morgan's memorandum and the testimony of District witnesses demonstrate that a 
primary reason for the District's decision to eliminate the practice was the distraction to 
remedial education caused by the presence and misbehavior of teachers' children. According 
to District witnesses, teachers cannot be effectively provide remedial instruction if they are 
. simultaneously supervising their own children. Two other articulated reasons for the unilateral 
change are concerns over safety and security: the potential for teachers' children to be injured 
due to the lack of supervision during faculty and departmental meetings; and the possibility 
j that intruders may avoid detection under the new high school security system by entering the 
building along with teachers'children. . 
) . DISCUSSION 
There are certain fundamental policy decisions at the core of an employer's primary 
mission that are managerial prerogatives and, therefore, not mandatorily negotiable under the 
Act, but are subject to impact bargaining.7 Nevertheless, an employer's mission does not 
constitute a license to unilaterally act in any manner an employer deems appropriate. Rather, 
6
 Transcript, p. 87. 
7
 See, County of Erie v. Pub. Employ Rel Bd, 12 NY3d 72, 42 PERB H7002 (2009); West 
Irondequoit Teachers Assn v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46, 7 PERB |J7014 (1974); New Rochelle City 
Sch Dist, 4 PERB ^3060 (1971). 
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f'\ the employer can unilaterally act only to the extent that it does not significantly or 
unnecessarily intrude on the protected interests of bargaining unit employees.8 
In the present case, we find that the effective provision of remedial education during the 
tenth period constitutes an essential element of the District's core pedagogical mission. Unlike 
the facts in Otselic Valley,9 the child care practice in the present case took place at a time 
when unit members were expected to provide remedial instruction. In addition, the District's 
concerns over safety during the remedial period are also mission-related. 
The record includes unrefuted testimony concerning Chase's specific complaints to 
Morgan and the Board of Education concerning disturbances caused by misconduct of 
teachers' children during the tenth period. It is undisputed that Chase made these complaints 
before and during his tenure as Association President, and expressed agreement when 
\ Morgan informed him of the District's decision to end the past practice. Although called as a 
witness by the Association, Chase's testimony was short and limited to denying that as 
Association President "in the last year I never told anyone to end it, unilaterally end [the past , 
practice]."10 We draw a negative inference11 based upon Chase's failure to refute the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from his complaints to the District that the misbehavior and 
disturbances interfered with the District's delivery of remedial instruction during the tenth 
8
 County of Montgomery, 18 PERB fl3077. (1985); State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services), 38 PERB 1J3008 (2005). ' 
9
 Supra, note 2. 
10
 Transcript, pp. 184-185. 
J 11 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB fl3033 (2008); Livingston County Coalition 
of Patrol Services, 44 PERB 1J3036 (2011). 
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period, and the presence of the unsupervised children of unit members created an unsafe 
environment.12 
While the past practice of permitting children of Association unit members to be present 
at the high school during tenth period is an economic benefit related to childcare expenses,13 
the unilateral decision to end that practice is necessary and proportional to meet the District's 
core educational mission of providing effective remedial academic assistance. The evidence of 
disruption and distractions caused by the presence of the Association members' children 
confirms the necessity of ending the practice in order for the District to meet its core, mission of 
providing remedial education and ensuring a safe environment at the high school. 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that theDistrict was not required'to negotiate . 
the cessation of the child care past practice at the high school. Having reached this 
conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to reach the District's other exceptions. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the charge is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
/ Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
SSQ^^J^ 
Sheila S. ColeC Member 
12
 West Hempstead Union Free Sch Dist, 14 PERB 1J3096 (1981). 
y 13
 Otseljc Valley Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 2. 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Montgomery 
(County) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) on an improper practice charge filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) finding 
that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it failed to provide CSEA with certain requested information and documents • 
concerning a pending grievance under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the County asserts that the Assistant Director's decision should 
be reversed based upon the Appellate Division, Third Department's decision in Pfau v 
1
 43 PERB 114615(2010). 
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New York State Public Employment Relations Board,2 which affirmed the vacatur of a 
prior Board decision.3 CSEA supports the Assistant's Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director, as modified. 
FACTS 
Under the terms of the parties' collectively negotiated agreement, a CSEA unit 
member has a contract right to file a grievance at Step 3 of the grievance procedure 
challenging the implementation of a disciplinary penalty.4 Pursuant to Article XI, 
§4(d)(1) of the agreement, if CSEA is dissatisfied with the County's Step 3 grievance 
determination, CSEA may file a demand for binding arbitration with PERB under our 
Rules of Procedure for voluntary grievance arbitration.5 The responsibilities and powers 
of the arbitrator selected to determine a grievance are delineated in Article XI, §4(d)(1) 
of the agreement. 
In July 2009, a CSEA representative filed a grievance at Step 3 of the grievance 
procedure on behalf of unit member David Giovannone (Giovannone) challenging the 
County's implementation of a disciplinary penalty against Giovannone. Thereafter, 
CSEA filed a demand for arbitration with PERB, resulting in the selection of an arbitrator 
to determine the grievance. Following selection of the arbitrator, the County refused 
2
 24 Misc3d 260, 42 PERB 1J7003 (Sup Ct Albany County 2009), affd, 69 AD3d 1080, 43 
PERB 1J7001 (3d Dept 2010). 
3
 State of New York-Unified Court System, 41 PERB H3009 (2008). 
4
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A, Article X, §2(d), Article XI, §4(c) 
5
 4 NYCRR §207. 
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CSEA's requests for the production of information and documents to enable it to 
evaluate the pending grievance and to defend Giovannone at arbitration. 
DISCUSSION 
For close to four decades, we have held that under the Act an employee 
organization has a general right to receive documents and information requested from 
an employer for use by the employee organization in the administration of a collectively 
negotiated agreement including processing a grievance and preparing for a grievance 
hearing and/or arbitration. Failure of an employer to produce requested information and 
documents may constitute a violation of both §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act.6 
Under the Act, an employee organization is entitled to a reasonable opportunity 
to examine requested information and documents before determining whether to 
continue to process a grievance. The right to receive, information and documents 
extends after a grievance has been processed to arbitration.7 
Our decisions applying the Act's duty to provide information to cases involving 
the grievance/arbitration of disciplinary matters have been consistently upheld.8 In 
6
 Board of Education, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 1J3012 (1973); Hornell 
Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB 1J3032 (1976); State of New York (Dept of Health and Roswell 
Memorial Institute), 26 PERB P072 (1993); City of Rochester, 29 PERB 1J3070 (1996); 
Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB 1J3019 (2001); County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff, 36 PERB 1J3021 (2003), confirmed sub nom. County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14, 37 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dept 2004). 
7
 Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch Dist, 33 PERB P059 (2000). 
8
 Town of Evans, 37 PERB 1J3016 (2004); State of New York (OMRDD), 38 PERB 
H3036 (2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 14 
Misc3d 199, 39 PERB 1J7009 (2006), affd, 46 AD3d 1037, 40 PERB 1J7009 (3d Dept 
2007); Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist, 4.1 PERB |[3008 (2008), confirmed sub 
nom. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 62 AD3d 
1066, 42 PERB 1J7005 (3d Dept 2009), mot denied, 42 PERB fl7006 (3d Dept 2009), Iv 
denied, 13 NY3d 711, 42 PERB H7009 (2009). 
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County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff v State of New York,9 the Appellate Division, 
Third Department confirmed and enforced our decision finding that an employer violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act when it refused to provide requested documents needed by an 
employee organization to investigate and process a disciplinary grievance to arbitration 
under a negotiated grievance/arbitration procedure. Two years later, the same court in 
Civil Service Employees Association v New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board,™ affirmed the dismissal of an Article 78 proceeding challenging our 
determination that an employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by refusing to provide 
requested relevant and necessary information needed by CSEA to defend unit 
members at disciplinary grievance arbitration. Subsequently, the court confirmed 
another Board decision finding a violation of §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act when a school 
district failed to produce requested information and documents needed to investigate 
the termination of a unit member.11 
In support of its exceptions, the County misconstrues the decision in Pfau v New 
York State Public Employment Relations Board}2 In that decision, the Appellate 
Division, Third Department cited with favor the above-referenced decisions upholding 
our determinations finding employers to have violated the Act by failing to produce 
requested information and documents concerning disciplinary grievances and 
arbitrations. The Appellate Division, however, distinguished those decisions by holding 
9
 Supra, note 8. 
10
 Supra, note 8. 
11
 Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note, 
8. 
12
 Supra, note 1. • 
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that the duty to provide information under the Act does not extend to requiring the 
Unified Court System to provide prehearing disclosure to an employee organization in 
the context of a disciplinary procedure created by the Rules of the Chief Judge,13 which 
was then incorporated into a negotiated agreement. 
The holding in Pfau v New York State Public Employment Relations Board is 
inapplicable to the present case because CSEA seeks documents and information to 
evaluate a pending contract grievance concerning discipline and to enable it to provide 
representation to the at-issue unit member at arbitration pursuant to the negotiated 
terms of the parties' agreement. 
Based upon the foregoing, the County's exceptions are denied, and the Assistant 
Director's decision is affirmed.14 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County provide CSEA with the following 
information and documents concerning the pending grievance and arbitration regarding 
unit member David Giovannone: 
a) copies of all documents and other tangible evidence that the 
County may rely upon at the arbitration; 
b) copies of all statements, in any form, made by the witnesses the 
v
 County may call atthe arbitration; 
c) copies of all statements, in any form, made by any other 
witnesses to the events alleged to form the basis for the 
disciplinary action; 
13
 22 NYCRR §25.29. 
14
 We have modified the remedial order consistent with the facts in the record. 
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d) identification by name, employment title, office address and 
office telephone number of each witness, whether or not 
employed by the County, that it may call at the arbitration; 
e) identification by name, employment title, office address and 
office telephone number of any official of the County who 
investigated the allegations against the grievant and, if a report 
A was put in writing, a copy of the report; and 
f) sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and 
electronic locations ordinarily used to post written 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Montgomery in the unit represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the County 
will provide CSEA with the following information and documents concerning the pending 
grievance and arbitration regarding unit member David Giovannone: 
1. copies of all documents and other tangible evidence that the County may rely upon 
at the arbitration; 
2. copies of all statements, in any form, made by the witnesses the County may call at 
the arbitration; 
3. . copies of all statements, in any form, made by any other witnesses to the events 
that form the basis for the disciplinary action; 
4. identification by name, employment title, office address and office telephone 
number of each witness, whether or not employed by the County, that it may call at 
the arbitration; and , 
5. identification by name, employment title, office address and office telephone 
number of any official of the employer who investigated the allegations against the 
grievant and, if a report was put in writing, a copy of the report. 
Dated By 
on behalf of the County of Montgomery 
Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
CASE NO. U-29112 
In the Matter of . 




COUNTY OF TOMPKINS AND TOMPKINS 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
MARILYN D. BERSON, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JONATHAN WOOD, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Upon our review of the exceptions by the Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association (Association) to the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1 
dismissing its charge alleging that County of Tompkins and Tompkins County Sheriff 
(Joint Employer) violated §209-a.1(d), and the Joint Employer's response thereto, we 
affirm the dismissal of the charge for the reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision. The 
method of distributing overtime becomes a mandatory subject of negotiations only after 
an employer decides to make overtime available.2 Therefore, the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 201/1 
Albany, New York 
-"" Sheila S. C^Te, Member 
1
 44 PERB H4580 (2011). 
2
 Buffalo Sewer Authority, 30 PERB 1J3018 (1997). 
1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, GREENE 
COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 2790G, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27095 
- a n d - ' • • ' ' 
COUNTY OF GREENE and SHERIFF OF GREENE 
COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
ENNIO J. CORSI, ESQ. GENERAL COUNSEL (CHRISTINE CAPUTO 
GRANICH of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS GOLD & MINEAUX LLP (DIONNE A. WHEATLEY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
N BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the New York State Law 
Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Greene County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association, Local 2790G (Council 82) to a decision by the Assistant Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director),1 following a 
remand, on an improper practice charge filed by Council 82 alleging that the County of 
Greene and the Sheriff of Greene County (Joint Employer) violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to disclose during 
1
 43 PERB 1J4579 (2010). 
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negotiations that acceptance of its health care proposals would result in an increase in 
co-payments for doctor office visits. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In her original decision, the Assistant Director dismissed Council 82's charge 
based upon a finding that the joint employer had met its burden of demonstrating its 
duty satisfaction defense.2 Council 82 filed exceptions asserting that the Assistant 
Director erred in sustaining the duty satisfaction defense and erred in failing to 
determine its allegation that the joint employer violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
by failing to disclose during negotiations that the financial impact associated with 
accepting its proposed health insurance concessions. 
Following our review, we granted Council 82's exceptions, in part, and remanded 
the case to the Assistant Director to determine the merits of the claim that the joint 
employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by failing to disclose the fact that the co-
payments would increase as the result of accepting the joint employer's health care 
proposals.3 In our decision, we stated that Council 82 may renew its exceptions with 
respect to the Assistant Director sustaining the duty satisfaction defense.4 
2
 42 PERB 1J4513 (2009). 
3
 42 PERB 1J3031 (2009). 
4
 Supra, note 2, 42 PERB 1J3031 at 3116,' n.14. 
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Upon remand, the Assistant Director concluded that Council 82 failed to 
demonstrate that the Joint Employer's failure to disclose the at-issue information 
violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Act.5 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, Council 82 asserts that the Assistant Director misconstrued the 
testimony of its sole witness and erred in failing to credit his testimony that following a 
request, the Joint Employer failed to provide the at-issue information. In addition, 
Council 82 contends that the Assistant Director erred in concluding that the Joint 
Employer had no duty to provide the information because it was available elsewhere, 
and that Council 82 failed to demonstrate that the parties had a past practice of fully 
disclosing cost information.concerning health insurance benefits during negotiations.6 
The Joint Employer supports the Assistant Director's decision. ' -
Based upon the evidence in the record before us, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision. 
FACTS 
The. Joint Employer and Council.82 were parties to a January 1, 2003-December 
31, 2005 collectively negotiated agreement (agreement). The agreement included the 
5
 Supra, note 1. 
6
 In its exceptions, Council 82 has not renewed its exception to the Assistant Director's 
original decision sustaining the Joint Employer's duty satisfaction defense. It is, 
therefore, waived under §2.13.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). See, Town of 
Orangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), confirmed Town of Orangetown v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). 
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following provision concerning prescription drug and doctor office visit co-payment costs 
for employees enrolled in the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plan: 
The prescription drug co-pay and doctor visit co-pays shall 
be the minimum cost offered by the PPO carrier. If the 
prescription drug co-payments and/or doctor visit co-
payments increase above the minimum level, the additional 
costs will be the responsibility of the employee.7 
The parties commenced negotiations for a successor agreement on January 24, 
'2006, and exchanged proposals at the second bargaining session on February 6, 2006. 
Three subsequent bargaining sessions led to the parties executing a memorandum of 
agreement on March 9, 2006. Two of the Joint Employer's bargaining proposals 
concerned health benefits. One demand proposed amending the expired agreement to 
add the subject of co-payments for doctor office visits to the list of topics to be reviewed 
by the pre-existing labor-management Health Insurance Committee.8 The second 
proposal sought two health benefit concessions: elimination of the three month carry-
over option regarding deductibles and a decrease of the maximum eligibility age for 
dependent children in college from 25 to 23. 
During negotiations, the Joint Employer was fully aware that if Council 82 
accepted the proposals for health benefit concessions there would be an automatic 
increase in the minimum co-payments for doctor office visits. This knowledge was 
based upon the Joint Employer's experience with other bargaining units that had 
7
 Joint Exhibit 2, §9.2.2(B). ' ' 
8
 Under the expired agreement, the Committee was authorized to review and make 
recommendations with respect to prescription drugs, insurance co-payments and/or . 
deductibles. 
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accepted the same proposals during negotiations, which resulted in an increase in co-
payments from $10 to $15. The Joint Employer's negotiations team made a conscious 
decision not to disclose this information to Council 82 because the expired agreement 
already addressed the issue of minimum costs for the co-payments and that any 
additional costs would be the responsibility of the unit member. 
At the hearing, Council 82 representative Richard Stevens (Stevens) testified that 
he asked the Joint Employer's representatives during negotiations whether acceptance 
of the health benefit proposals would have any other consequences to unit members.9 
The Assistant Director, however, did not credit Stevens's testimony that he made such a 
request.10 
On March 9, 2006, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
containing modifications to the expired agreement including the joint employer's two 
health benefit proposals. The MOA was subsequently ratified and is silent with respect 
to increasing the amount of co-payments for doctor office visits. In June, 2006, unit 
members learned, when they received their new health insurance cards, that their co-
payments had been increased to $15 a visit. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 69-70. 
10
 During the hearing, Greene County Director of Personnel Audrey G. Adrezin 
(Adrezin) testified that she did not recall such an inquiry from Council 82 during 
negotiations. Transcript, p. 36. 
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Consistent with the MOA, on November 8, 2006, the parties executed a 
successor agreement for the period January 1, 2006-December 31, 2008.11 Section 
9.2.2 of the successor agreement states, in relevant part that: 
B. The prescription drug co-pay and doctor visit co-pays shall be the 
minimum cost offered by the HMO carrier. If the prescription drug co-
payments and/or doctor visit co-payments increase above the 
minimum level, the additional costs will be the responsibility of the 
employee. 
C. Any change to the prescription drugs, insurance co-pays, doctor visit 
co-pays and/or deductibles will be referred to a Health Insurance 
Committee comprised of three (3) Union and three (3) County people. 
The Committee will review the matter and make a recommendation 
as to how to proceed. If the recommendation of the Committee is not 
accepted, the increase proposed by the carrier will be implemented. 
The implementation of the higher prescription drug co-pay, insurance 
co-payment, doctor visit co-pays or deductible will not be subject to 
the grievance procedure or form the basis for an improper practice 
charge. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that an employer's general duty to provide information 
encompasses a duty to give a response to a request for information reasonably relevant 
and necessary to contract negotiations.12 
Following our careful review of the record in the present case, we affirm the 
Assistant Director's conclusion that Council 82 failed to prove that it made an 
information request during negotiations triggering an obligation upon the Joint Employer 
11
 Joint Exhibit No. 1. 
12
 Village of Johnson City, 12 PERB P020 (1979); State of New York (GOER), 25 . 
PERB p078 (1992), confirmed sub nom, New York State Inspection, Sec and Law 
Enforcement Empis v Kinsella, 197 AD2d 341, 27 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 1994); Board 
ofEduc City School Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 1J3012 (1973). 
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to provide information about the increase in co-payments associated with its proposals. 
There is no objective evidence in the record that warrants our disturbing the Assistant 
Director's credibility determination concerning Council 82's witness Stevens.13 During 
his testimony, Stevens did not articulate any specific details concerning the purported 
request, including the particular session in which it was made, or the verbal interaction 
between the parties at the table. Furthermore, his notes from the negotiations are silent 
with respect to a request for information, as is Council 82's charge.14 
We also affirm the Assistant Director's determination that Stevens's conclusory 
testimony alone, concerning an alleged past practice of the Joint Employer fully 
disclosing health care cost information in prior negotiations, is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the Joint Employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it failed to 
volunteer the at-issue information in the present case. Therefore, Council 82 has failed 
to meet its burden of proof. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
kfyCn<erfot_ 
Jerome Lefkowilz, Chaij^rson 
CD 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
13 County of Tioga, 44 PERB 1J3016 (2011). 
14
 Charging Party Exhibit 3. Having affirmed the Assistant Director's creditability 
determination that Council 82 did not ask for the information, it is not necessary for us to 
reach the issue whether Council 82 could have obtained it from another source, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BETHLEHEM POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29785 
- and -
TOWN OF BETHLEHEM, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS J. JORDAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP (MICHAEL J. SMITH of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Bethlehem. (Town) to 
a decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director)1 on a charge filed by the Bethlehem Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA) finding that the Town improperly refused to negotiate the impact of the promotion 
of a PBA-unit employee to a non-unit position. 
The case was submitted to the Assistant Director on a stipulated record limited to 
four pieces of correspondence: a PBA letter dated December 3, 2009, requesting 
impact negotiations; a Town letter dated December 8, 2009, responding to PBA's 
request; a PBA letter dated December 29, 2009, modifying the substance of impact 
1
 43 PERB H45.T9(2010). 
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negotiation demand; and a Town email dated January 14, 2010, refusing the request for 
impact negotiations.2 
The Assistant Director concluded that the Town violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act 
when it refused PBA's December 29, 2009 demand for negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
The Assistant Director found that PBA's original December 3, 2009 demand may 
have been a nonmandatory unitary demand because it included a nonmandatory 
subject, staffing.3 The Assistant Director, however, did not reach the issue because 
she concluded that PBA, after receiving the Town's December 8, 2009 response, 
abandoned its original proposal and submitted a distinct and different proposal for 
impact negotiations in its December 29, 2009 letter. Following our review, we affirm the 
Assistant Director's conclusion that PBA abandoned its original demand. Therefore, we 
also reject the Town's argument that the December 3, 2009 and December 29, 2009 
letters constitute a unitary demand.4 The duration language cited by the Town merely 
identifies the change that is causing the impact and indicates that PBA is seeking 
compensation for as long as the impact-causing condition persists. 
2
 The relevanttext of the correspondence is set forth in the Assistant Director's 
decision, and need not be repeated here. 
3
 Supra, note 1, n. 7. 
4
 A unitary demand is a proposal containing multiple sections or paragraphs which 
cannot be reasonably understood to constitute severable and independent proposals. 
Village of Highland Falls, 42 PERB P020 at 3072 (2009); Pearl River Union Free Sen 
Dist, 11 PERB 1J3085 (1978); City of Oneida PBA, 15 PERB 1J3096 (1982); City of 
Newburgh, 18 PERB1J3065 (1985), confirmed sub nom. City of Newburgh v Newman, 
19 PERB 1J7005 (Sup Ct Albany County 1986). The two PBA proposals are clearly 
severable from each other, with the latter being responsive to the Town's December 8, 
2009 letter. 
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Finally, we reject the Town's challenge to the Assistant Director's conclusion that 
it is obligated to engage in negotiations concerning the December 29, 2009 demand. 
The proposal seeks compensation for impacted unit employees. It does not seek to 
interfere with the Town's managerial prerogatives. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Town's exceptions and order the Town to 
negotiate the impact of the vacancy created by the promotion of a unit employee to a 
non-unit position, as demanded in PBA's December 29, 2009 request, and to sign and 
post the attached notice at all locations normally used to communicate both in writing 
and electronically with unit employees. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowit^f Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole', Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Bethlehem (Town) in the unit 
represented by the Bethlehem Police Benevolent Association (PBA) that the 
Town will forthwith negotiate with PBA concerning the impact of a vacancy 
created by the promotion of a unit employee to a non-unit position, pursuant to 
PBA's December 29, 2009 request. 
Dated . . . . . . . . . . By . , 
on behalf of Town of Bethlehem 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SOUTH GLENS FALLS, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29960 
- and -
SOUTH GLENS FALLS POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH GLENS FALLS POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29987 
- and -
VILLAGE OF SOUTH GLENS FALLS, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for South Glens Falls Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. 
ROEMER WALLENS GOLD & MINEAUX LLP (DIONNE A. WHEATLEYof 
counsel), for Village of South Glens Falls 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the South Glens Falls 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ)1 finding that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it submitted to interest arbitration subsection (a) of its proposal to amend 
Article XV, §1, Hours of Work, of the expired collectively negotiated agreement 
1
 44 PERB H4551 (2011). 
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(agreement) between the Village of South Glens Falls (Village) and PBA, and directing 
PBA to withdraw that portion of its proposal. The ALJ concluded that subsection (a) is 
nonmandatory because it seeks to fix the days off for each tour of duty, thereby limiting 
the Village's right to determine its staffing needs.2 In addition, PBA excepts to the ALJ's 
conclusion that the Village did not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act by submitting its' 
Proposal 16 to interest arbitration. According to PBA, the wage reimbursement aspect 
of Village's proposal constitutes a prohibited subject of negotiations under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).3 The Village supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that while an employer has the managerial prerogative to 
determine its staffing and deployment needs, it remains obligated under the Act to 
negotiate mandatory subjects such as tours of duty, shift assignments, and days to be 
worked, which constitute the means to meet those staffing needs4 We find the record 
unclear as to whether, in conjunction with its proposal to amend Article XV §1 (a) of the 
agreement, PBA also seeks to delete from Article XV §1 (d) of the agreement the 
Village's explicit retention of its prerogative to determine staffing levels. If this is PBA's 
intent, its proposal to amend Article XV§1(a) of the agreement is nonmandatory but if it 
2
 The text of the at-issue proposals are set forth in the ALJ's decision, and need not be 
repeated here. An ambiguity exists, however, as to whether PBA's second tour of duty 
proposal is intended to amend Article XV §1 (b) or (d). 
329USC§201,efseq. . 
4
 City of White Plains, 5 PERB p 0 0 8 (1972); Town of Blooming Grove, 21 PERB 
1J3032 (1988);W//age of Mamaroneck PBA, 22 PERB 1J3029 (1989); Town ofYorktown 
PBA, 35 PERB P017 (2002); City of New York, 40 PERB H 3017 (2007). 
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is not PBA's intent, we would find the proposal mandatory.5 
We also affirm the ALJ's conclusion that Village Proposal 16 is a mandatory 
subject of negotiations. In City of Mount Vernon,6 we held that a training 
reimbursement fee for employees who resign within three years of appointment is a 
mandatory subject because it is a compensation issue. Contrary to PBA's argument, 
the wage forfeiture aspect of the Village's proposal for expense reimbursement 
associated with attending police training school by employees who leave Village service 
within one year does not violate the FLSA because, on its face, it does not seek to 
deprive unit members of the federal minimum wage for any given workweek.7 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny PBA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. Therefore, Case No. U-29987 is hereby dismissed 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that PBA withdraw subsection (a) of its 
proposal seeking to amend Article XV, §1 from interest arbitration or amend its proposal 
to retain the Village's explicit managerial prerogative to determine staffing. 
DATED: November 30, 2011 /j 
Albany, New York. Krl/AsCrryij^ 
v 
/ Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. C6le, Member 
5
 Instead of remanding the case to the ALJ for a resolution of the ambiguity, we have 
chosen to modify the proposed remedial order. 
6
 18 PERB 113020(1985). 
7
 See, Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F3d 1092 (9th Cir 2010); Heder v City of Two 
Rivers, 295 F3d 777 (7th Cir 2002). Our conclusion that the proposal is not prohibited 
does not excuse the Village from complying with its obligations under the FLSA. 
